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Abstract
Social engineering is the art and science of persuading individuals to bypass inplace security mechanisms causing the unintended release of information. It is
a low tech solution to a high tech problem and is as much an art as a science. As
is true of many such solutions, social engineering is both ill-defined yet extremely
effective. Its low cost, high payoff nature makes it an extremely attractive alternative
to adversaries that do not have access to all the resources of a nation state. However,
with full backing, the weapon can become that much more effective.
Social engineering is something the Department of Defense already does. All
branches of the military have Red Teaming organizations that use social engineering
methods as part of their mission to assess and improve internal security measures.
While network and physical protection mechanisms have become more robust, the
human remains the weak point of any defense, and social engineering will nearly
always succeed.
As the Air Force organizes, trains, and equips its new cyber warrior force, it
will need to operationalize social engineering principles in order to grow a repeatable,
sustainable capability. However social engineering remains a poorly defined concept
for the Air Force in particular and the Department of Defense in general. It is some-
thing practiced but on a limited scope and with little standardization. Despite its
successes, social engineering has yet to achieve widespread acceptance.
The focus of this paper is on the use of offensive social engineering. There are
three main points. First, establish legitimacy and demonstrate that social engineering
is in fact compatible with existing Air Force and Joint military doctrine. This is done
with a thorough analysis of doctrine and historical writings about military deception,
psychological operations, and related concepts.
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Second, social engineering arrives in the operational realm by discussing a frame-
work for measuring its effects. A primary concern for any implementation of a cyber
weapon is measuring its effectiveness. A well known process, Aerospace Intelligence
Preparation of the Battlespace, is extrapolated and adapted for use in this realm.
Finally, requirements for a training plan are developed as a first step in the
implementation process.
v
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Operationalizing Offensive Social Engineering
for the Air Force
I. Introduction
An experiment performed in 2005 hooked six computers up to a DSL connection in
order to record cyber-attacks against them. In less than four minutes, an automated
attack had broken through the computers security defenses [28]
Social Engineering describes a class of computer hacking tools that target the userof the system rather than the system itself. It is a proven and viable attack vec-
tor that includes methods like phishing, pharming, and persuasion [35] [25]. The Air
Force uses social engineering to a limited extent as a validation tool when assessing the
security posture of a unit or installation. Units like the 57th Information Aggressor
Squadron based at Nellis Air Force Base routinely employ social engineering tech-
niques as they perform their mission [6] [43]. However, this is the only employment
of social engineering currently evidenced in the Air Force inventory.
The Air Force has embraced cyberspace as an operational domain and has begun
to organize, train and equip a force to operate in that domain [30]. As such, the Air
Force should focus on the cultivation and employment of all possible methods to
achieve supremacy in that domain.
1.1 Definition
Social engineering is a weapon that could deliver this supremacy. Social engi-
neering has many definitions dependent on the context and personal biases However,
Winkler and Dealy [49] provide a good definition with
the process of using social interactions to obtain information about a
“victims” computer system
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While this is a good overview, it misses the elements of art and science so an alternative
that incorporates the three key elements of social engineering is used. This definition
is
The art and science of convincing a person to willingly provide infor-
mation under false pretenses
It fully encompasses the three key elements of social engineering which are:
• Information
• Persuasion
• Deception
Anecdotal evidence gleaned from both interviews and literature reviews places
the effectiveness of social engineering at or near 100 percent [43]. Based on this
widespread success in the civilian world, social engineering seems a logical fit for an
organization looking for the next best weapon. Additionally, social engineering has
the rare and enviable trait of being extremely low cost, both in terms of training
and execution [49]. These attributes indicate it is an attractive option to adversaries
of the United States although their employment of it and US defense against it are
outside the scope of this research. The discussion is limited to the Air Force although
much of the research could be applied throughout the Department of Defense.
1.2 Implications
This research is firmly grounded in the reality and requirements of today’s Air
Force. Some forms of social engineering, like phishing, have become a top security
threat currently facing civilian corporations [46]. From automated chat programs that
impersonate people in order to collect personal information [22] to tactics used by
current Air Force Red Teams attempting to assess the security stance of a particular
unit, social engineering is inexpensive, low tech, and effective.
Figure 1.1 shows a briefing slide from a presentation recently put together by
Hurlburt Air Force Base’s Information Operations Office in response to some concerns
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of their members. The information was posted to a social networking site billing itself
as military only but with no military ties. In fact, the hosting server is based in Nova
Scotia and the company that owns it is German [26]. Social engineering is everywhere.
Figure 1.1: Member Profile on a Social Networking Website [26]
1.3 Purpose
Recognizing the advantages of social engineering and its current lack of incor-
poration in the Air Force arsenal, this research creates an argument for utilizing
offensive social engineering in the Air Force. It outlines the underpinnings of social
engineering, illuminating the powerful psychological cues that create the high success
rate. It discusses where social engineering fits in current doctrine, drawing parallels
to familiar concepts. It takes an existing, accepted, methodology and alters it for use
in planning and evaluating a social engineering attack. Finally, it presents research
done in task identification and the resulting training objectives.
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The analysis begins with the background of social engineering, reviewing the
exploits of Kevin Mitnick who is perhaps the most famous hacker in the United
States [29] and whose most successful operations used social engineering techniques.
The essence of social engineering, persuasion, is discussed as well as the psychological
underpinnings that make it effective. Exploring human-computer interaction, research
being done at Stanford University by Dr. Fogg on a new area of study called Captology
is reviewed. This thesis reviews Influence Operations, a term that arguably points
to social engineering. Chapter Three outlines the research methodology used and
illuminates the iterative process involved. Chapter Four presents the results of the
research, demonstrating the link between social engineering and Influence Operations,
providing a framework for planning and evaluating social engineering operations, and
suggesting objectives to consider when training social engineers.
Research Questions:
1. Is Social Engineering a legitimate weapon for the Air Force to consider?
2. Can we demonstrate a link between Social Engineering and Information Oper-
ations?
3. Can a Social Engineering attack be planned and measured?
4. What objectives need to be met to train Social Engineers?
1.4 Outline
• Chapter II reviews background information and provides a framework for think-
ing about social engineering
• Chapter III outlines the framework used to conduct the research
• Chapter IV presents the results of the research
• Chapter V summarizes the findings and conclusions drawn from this research.
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II. Literature Review
All warfare is based on deception
–Sun Tzu
This chapter summarizes the literature reviewed in support of the research ques-tions. First, it is important to come to a clear understanding of what exactly
social engineering is and is not. To this end, background information on social engi-
neering, outlining two broad categories to assist thesis scope definition are reviewed.
Next, methods of social engineering, psychological underpinnings of social engineer-
ing, and psychological inroads for social engineering are discussed. Additionally, an
overview of a relatively new field of study, Captology, is presented. It encompasses
both types of social engineering by blending the technical into the psychological and
provides meaningful insight into the human-computer interaction at the heart of social
engineering. Finally, Joint Service and Air Force doctrine on Information Operations
are examined. A requirement to properly understand where social engineering may
fit in the future of the military is a full understanding of how the military views
similar techniques today. Towards that end, concepts of psychological operations and
military deception are explored.
2.1 Social Engineering Background
Social Engineering is fundamentally an issue with the system users rather than
with the system itself making it somewhat unique in the realm of computer security.
Computer security professionals tend to be more comfortable with technical challenges
and their associated technical solutions, the sheer number of hardware and software
based security solutions versus the number of user training solutions empirically bears
this out [35]. Figure 2.1 shows a simplified attack which is countered with technology
based security measures.
This is a simplified representation of the stance most often brought to mind
when discussing computer security. It has the classic elements of “us” and “them”
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Figure 2.1: Typical Attack Thwarted with Technology Based Security Measures
represented by the attacker and the target, respectively. Also, it has the notion of
some kind of security barrier between “us” and “them” that prevents intrusion.
Figure 2.2 shows how social engineering defeats all these security measures by
targeting the system user rather than the system itself.
Figure 2.2: Social Engineering Bypasses Technology Based Security by Going
Straight to the User
Social engineering blends two fields of study, pulling much of its power from
lessons learned in psychology and leveraging them against a computer system, by
way of the users of that system, thus blurring the line between the study of man and
the study of machine. However, as a portion of this chapter will show, there are some
researchers looking into this interaction and this thesis draws heavily on those efforts.
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Social engineering remains an attractive avenue of attack for many hackers.
The entry cost, which is defined as the funding and training required to effectively
compete with a given tool or weapon, is arguably the lowest of any form of computer
network attack [49]. Many of the techniques are familiar as everyone has tried to
use persuasion at some point in time. With the increased performance from desktop
computers, little more is needed than a network connection and a computer. For
$3000 or less, an adversary can wield a weapon with more potential for disruption
than anything they could acquire at 10 times the cost.
Social engineering is not a single idea but rather a collection of techniques.
Some of these will no doubt be familiar, like phishing, while others, like tailgating,
are probably only well-known inside the community of hackers and professional red
teamers that practice them. This research is not concerned with illuminating and
discussing the various implementations of social engineering, choosing instead to focus
on the broad methods social engineers use and the key abilities that enable their
practice. Drawing an analogy to the Air Force, the techniques discussed here are akin
to the basic skills a pilot must have in order to successfully and safely maneuver the
plane. The specific implementation is like the combat tactics developed for a given
platform. The discussion is constrained to the key skills.
It is not the intent of this research to draw absolute boundaries on what is
and is not social engineering. Like many technology-related areas of interest, lines of
definition are difficult to distinguish and quickly outdated. However, this research does
discuss many different techniques that fall under the social engineering umbrella. This
discussion is not intended as endorsement of any techniques legitimacy over another’s.
Rather, the focus is on proven results, using this as the criteria for inclusion.
2.2 Types of Social Engineering
For ease of understanding, social engineering can be broken down into two basic
types: Human-based and Technology-based [38].
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Human-based social engineering is the form most familiar. It is defined for
the purposes of this research as any social engineering effort that requires the active
participation of an engineer. In this context, and throughout the remainder of this
discussion, the term engineer is used to denote a person practicing social engineering.
Examples include impersonation, cold calling and in-person attacks. All activities
must be initiated and prosecuted by an engineer. Being the most hands-on type,
these techniques require the highest level of personal sophistication and are the most
difficult to teach.
Technology-based social engineering uses some degree of automation to achieve
the social engineering results. Phishing, pharming, and the use of chat bots to imper-
sonate people in online communities are all examples of this approach. The engineer
is involved at some point, if only to give the tool its instructions but the attack is
automated and occurs without direct human intervention. Since the third focus area
of this research is training effective social engineers, focus is limited to Human-based
methods.
2.2.1 Human Based Social Engineering. There are many different definitions
for the categories of a human based social engineering effort, every article written on
the subject seems to have different names for different techniques. However, many
of the themes remain the same. The presented terminology comes from arguably the
most famous social engineer, Kevin Mitnick [28]. Mitnick defines the following human
based social engineering techniques [32]:
• Trappings of Role
Trappings of Role is a technique where the social engineer exhibits a few char-
acteristics of the role he or she has chosen as their cover. For example, if imper-
sonating an executive, they might dress in a nice suit and speak with authority,
using a tone that does not invite disagreement or discussion. Other trappings
can be simple things like using industry jargon or mentioning other people that
work in the organization. The effectiveness of this method lies in its simplicity;
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only a few details are required to generate the image. Once the target has the
engineer associated with the desired role, they naturally fill in any details that
are missing, sometimes providing additional information in the process.
• Credibility
Credibility is established in three different ways. First, the social engineer can
argue a point that appears to be contrary to his or her best interest. A statement
like “make sure not to tell me your password” is an example of this kind of tactic.
Second, the social engineer can warn the target of an impending problem with
the system that the social engineer has in fact caused. For example, calling a
target to warn them of a service interruption and then causing the interruption.
Finally, the attacker may help the target solve a problem, placing the target
in a debt position relative to the attacker. This tactic is exceptionally effective
when combined with the second method as the engineer warns the target of an
impending negative situation, causes the situation, and then helps the target
resolve the situation unbeknownst to the target. The engineer is in control of
the entire process.
• Altercasting
Altercasting refers to placing the target into a role chosen for them. This usually
requires a good deal of skill on the part of the social engineer as the target needs
to be comfortable with the selected role while remaining totally unaware that
they are in it. The engineer needs to be able to read the comfort level of the
target and adjust accordingly; this “on the fly” adjustment is an example of the
art element to social engineering. For example, the social engineer can place
him or her self in a position of disadvantage pushing the target into the role of a
helper. Or the social engineer can become more aggressive, pushing the target
into a more submissive role. The choice of which role is appropriate is made
during the beginning of the interaction based on the engineers perception of the
target.
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• Distracting from Systematic Thinking
Systematic thinking is careful rational thought leading up to a conclusion and
is the enemy of the social engineer. It is the method of thinking used when
following rules and procedures. Heuristic thinking on the other hand involves
the use of mental shortcuts to arrive at conclusions more quickly. This type of
thinking is invoked when external pressures or cues are present that suggest a
certain decision to the target. For example, limiting the amount of time to reach
a decision forces the target to jump ahead to the conclusion before all relevant
factors have been considered. Alternatively, a person may use heuristic thinking
when they believe the person making the request is in a position of authority
and that this alone justifies the request. The engineer invokes this thought
process by creating an environment of artificial pressure or by capitalizing on
some pressure organic to the situation.
• Momentum of Compliance
Social engineers also seek to create a momentum of compliance by asking the
target for easy favors and gradually building toward what they really want.
When the request(s) of real value are made, the target is accustomed to com-
plying and so finds it difficult to shift behavior and deny the request. This is an
advanced technique that also requires a lot of skill as the requests should build
on each other incrementally in terms of importance. If the gap between the
innocuous questions and the important questions is perceived to be too large
by the target, the momentum may falter.
• Desire to Help
People who help other people get definite benefits from the transaction, from
a feeling of accomplishment to an elevation in mood. Social engineers seek to
exploit this desire to help by casting themselves in a position that puts others
in a position to help them. This effect is often magnified by the lowered value
the target places on the information they hold. They do not fully understand
its importance and so may think it harmless or even useless. Therefore, the
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help the target provides seems like a low cost event for them, increasing the
cost/benefit ratio and magnifying the positive feelings.
• Attribution
Attribution is a technique for creating a perception about who the social engineer
is. The engineer might hold a door open for someone, say please and thank you,
pretend to return money they found on the floor, anything to cast themselves in
a positive light. This in turn leads the target to ascribe other positive traits to
the engineer, making them more trustworthy and the target more likely to help.
Attribution can also refer to a technique for helping the target explain away
behavior. In this usage, the social engineer tells the target that someone else
said it was acceptable, or that the information requested is useless without some
other piece of information. This helps the target transfer the responsibility for
the situation to someone else, freeing them up to do what is asked.
• Liking
Social engineers understand that people are much more inclined to help people
they like so they try to be likeable. They mirror interests, backgrounds, values,
anything they can to make the target like them. This, like altercasting, involves
reading the target accurately and involves a good amount of skill.
• Fear
Fear is an excellent motivator. The engineer uses fear by creating a crisis situ-
ation that requires handling in a compressed time frame, usually to avoid some
other, more serious, consequence. This compels the target into the heuristic
mode of thinking as they no longer have time to process all elements before
making a decision. A favorite tactic involves the use of what Mr. Mitnick terms
“self-referential fear”. The impending dilemma only affects the social engineer,
it has no impact on or relevance to the target. For example, the engineer could
claim a need to access the system because they need a file it contains or else they
will be fired. The threat of termination has no impact on the target; instead it
places them in the role of someone who can help avert this outcome.
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• Reactance
Finally, reactance can be utilized to make a normally unacceptable request more
palatable. The engineer impersonates the IT department and informs a user of a
pending lengthy loss to network storage due to maintenance, for example. This
disruption is obviously upsetting so the engineer offers a way out if the target
will just supply some key information to assist the work around. The request
for personal information that normally is met with skepticism is now viewed as
a favor.
Table 2.1 summarizes the information to this point.
2.3 Social Engineering and Psychology
A firm grasp on why social engineering works is required in order to completely
understand and implement it. As stated earlier, social engineering crosses discipline
boundaries, leveraging psychological mechanisms against a technological goal. A com-
plete view of this interaction begins with a full understanding of social engineering’s
foundation. Additionally, the information outlined here will facilitate a later discus-
sion on the most advantageous ways to train warfighters in this unique arena.
The heart of social engineering is persuasion, persuading a target to release some
information that the engineer finds desirable. Much has been written on mechanisms
of persuasion. Thomas Peletier’s article titled “Social Engineering: Concepts and
Solutions” condensed the information in an easily understandable fashion. Mr. Peltier
outlines four human traits that social engineers exploit [38]:
• The Desire to be Helpful
• A Tendency to Trust People
• Fear of Getting Into Trouble
• Willingness to Cut Corners
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If anything, these traits are magnified in the military culture. Every wing, group,
squadron, flight performs some function which is in turn a service to someone else.
Even combat operations are a service when viewed from the seat of the combatant
commander. In fact, Service Before Self is one of the Air Force’s three Core Values.
This emphasis on service builds a strong desire to help. The Air Force is also a
Table 2.1: Summary of Human Based Social Engineering Techniques and Their
Associated Characteristics
Technique Characteristics
Trappings of Role Small number of key traits for assumed role
Allow target to fill in the rest
Utilize jargon, names where possible
Credibility Argue a seemingly contrary point
Warn of upcoming system problem
Help target solve problem
Altercasting Read target to establish their most comfortable role
Assume the opposite role
Continue to read target and adjust accordingly
Distracting from Systematic Thought Provide external pressure
Provide implied reason to comply
Do not let target think through the request
Momentum of Compliance Ask easy questions at first, build toward goal
Incrementally increase question sensitivity
Do not end with desired information
Desire to Help Target gains emotional benefit from helping
Provide situation with low cost, high benefits
Importance of information often undervalued
Attribution Display favorable behavior
Target assigns other favorable behaviors
Provide target a way to explain their behavior
Liking People help those they like
Mirror interests, backgrounds, hobbies
Requires social charisma
Fear Create a crisis situation
Compels target into heuristic thought
Can also use self-referential fear
Reactance Makes a distasteful request more palatable
First offer unacceptable outcome
Then offer work-around if information is provided
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selectively manned force. While it remains all volunteer, applicants have to meet
certain requirements to join. Those that get to wear the uniform are in some ways
select and other members of the service respond to this. When someone else in uniform
comes for help, they receive the benefit of the doubt if for no other reason than
organizational affiliation. The Air Force is also very rank-oriented. It has a definitive
hierarchy that all members know and necessarily respect. This rank consciousness has
the side-effect of breeding a certain amount of fear, especially in those of lower ranks.
When a higher ranking individual requests something, the request is not questioned, it
is answered. Finally, the advent of Force Shaping coupled with increased deployment
and operations tempo has left virtually all members with too many tasks to accomplish
in too little time. This overabundance of work creates an atmosphere where any
chance to save time by cutting a corner looks attractive.
2.4 Social Engineering and Persuasion
Dr. Brad Sagarin is an associate professor in the Psychology Department at
Northern Illinois University and focuses his research in the area of persuasion. In
fact, he is quoted several times by Kevin Mitnick in his book The Art of Intrusion.
Dr. Sagarin’s work in the area of compliance, persuading individuals to say yes to a
proposition, yielded a set of influence principles that induce compliance [13]. These six
principles are reciprocity, social validation, commitment/consitency, friendship/liking,
scarcity, and authority. Interestingly, many of these same principles are mentioned
by Kevin Mitnick as methods available to a social engineer. Table 2.2 displays these
principles of influence as well as some descriptive characteristics.
Dr. Sagarin also discusses methods for employing or leveraging the influence
principles, many of which again are very similar to techniques discussed by Kevin
Mitnick. While Dr. Sagarin’s research does not focus on social engineering, the social
engineer makes use of these persuasion pressure points to gain the information desired.
Indeed, another researcher is currently working on effective ways to defend against
social engineering based in large part on Dr. Sagarin’s principles [40].
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Table 2.2: Overview of Dr. Sagarin’s Influence Principles
Principle of Influence Description
Reciprocity Returning a form of behavior that is displayed
Creating a feeling of need to repay
Sometimes Manifests as feeling of banking a future favor
Social Validation Correct action is determined by societal actions
Actions are appropriate and good if others do them
What others do carries even more value than what they think
Commitment/Consistency Commitment equated with intellectual strength
Once committed, subjects stay the course even if it is negative
Able to request actions consistent with committed stance
Friendship/Liking More favorably inclined to meet the needs of those we like
Attractiveness is a huge advantage
Similarity to subject indices liking and compliance
Scarcity Opportunities are more valuable when scare
True even if opportunity has little value by itself
Also invoked through feeling of losing a freedom (choice)
Authority Legal authority is extremely influential
Merits to possess authority not as important as position
Seen as in control of rewards and punishments
2.5 Captology
Dr. B.J. Fogg, a professor at Stanford University, introduced Captology in 1996
and continues to be the expert this new field of study. Captology is an acronym
based on the acronym “computers as persuasive technology” [19]. It is important to
note that Dr. Fogg does not view this persuasive relationship in terms of attackers
and targets, rather as a benign social interaction. However, given the focus of this
research and the obvious applicability of Dr. Fogg’s research, attention to his work is
warranted.
2.5.1 Computers as Tools. Dr. Fogg’s book is organized into three areas,
each devoted to one of the roles that computers play when they act in a persuasive
role. The first of these is Computers as Tools. Inside of this broad categorization, Dr.
Fogg defines seven persuasive technology tools that are available.
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• Reduction Technology: Persuading Through Simplifying
Reduction Technology provides the target with a range of options while ensuring
that the option of most benefit is also the easiest to follow. Alternatively, it
may also manifest by taking a complex task and eliminating the majority of
the obstacles until all that remains are a handful of simple tasks leading to the
desired outcome.
• Tunneling Technology: Guided Persuasion
Tunneling Technology presents a “predetermined sequence of actions or events”
which ultimately lead to a desired outcome. This approach is effective as it
generally simplifies task completion from the point of view of the subject. Ad-
ditionally, there is a tendency for most people to stay with a course of action
they have committed to, regardless of contrary evidence placed in their path.
• Tailoring Technology: Persuasion Through Customization
Tailoring Technology provides information that is specific to the user, giving
the illusion of complete customization. Spear phishing, the practice of sending
phishing e-mails containing personal information about the target [17], is a
timely example of this tool. A subset is tailoring for context which makes the
information specific to the intended recipient but also delivers that information
at a time or place when the recipient is most likely to find it useful.
• Suggestion Technology: Intervening at the Right Time
Suggestion Technology presents desired behaviors to the user at the most oppor-
tune moment. An example from the military is PSYOP operations that come
after a particularly devastating battle. Suggestion Technologies often build on
motivations or behaviors already in existence, presenting the suggestion at a
time when it will have the most impact.
• Self-Monitoring Technology: Taking the Tedium out of Tracking
Self-Monitoring Technology relies on the user to watch his or her own behavior
and adjust performance accordingly. This tool assumes a certain amount of
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desire to change on the part of the target and so offers limited benefit from an
offensive military standpoint.
• Surveillance Technology: Persuasion Through Observation
Surveillance Technology monitors the behavior of the subject but is purposefully
conspicuous. The subject is persuaded by knowledge that their actions are being
watched and so they change those behaviors accordingly. Covert surveillance
has a role in the military realm but when the stated goal is to persuade the
target to change behaviors, the surveillance must be overt and noticeable.
• Conditioning Technology: Reinforcing Target Behaviors
Conditioning Technology rewards the subject for displaying favorable behaviors.
In relation to Captology, it does not include punishing for incorrect behavior.
It is a time sensitive technology with the time schedule being driven by the
subject as the positive reinforcement must appear within a limited window in
order to have the desired effect. Interestingly, adding an element of randomness
to the reward is also beneficial; that is the reward for the displaying the desired
behavior always appears quickly if it appears at all. It does not manifest every
time. In this way, an addiction of sorts is created.
The common theme running through these tools is maximizing the cost/benefit
ratio for a system user. A user interacts with a computer to accomplish some task,
which is the basic reason for the interaction. Accomplishing that task has some cost
associated with it in terms of time, effort, thought, etc. The amount of cost required
to complete the intended task can be viewed as a cost/benefit ratio. The cost of
accomplishing the task versus the payoff of task completion. Since the benefit is
fixed, the task is either complete or it is not, the only variable remaining is the cost.
Thus, by reducing the perceived cost of accomplishing a task, the system has in effect
elevated the cost/benefit ratio.
2.5.2 Persuasive Media. The second role that a computer can assume when
acting in a role to persuade humans is that of Persuasive Media. In this role, the
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computer and the information it provides become the medium through which a user
has an experience. Computer simulations are excellent examples of this.
As Persuasive Media, computers allow humans to try out new ideas, new sce-
narios and new behaviors without ever really changing them. If the experiment runs
astray, they simply reset and try again. This no-fault method of trial and error can
be a powerful persuader.
Of particular interest is the tendency of a target experiencing a simulation to
discount the accuracy of what they are shown. People tend to get too wrapped up in
what is being presented to worry about how accurate it is. This enables simulation
designers to include their own biases into the virtual reality they have created and
have those biases subtly accepted by the target.
2.5.3 Persuasive Social Actor. The third and final role that a computer can
assume is that of a Persuasive Social Actor. This particular employment of social
engineering is outside the scope of this research and is mentioned for background
information only. In this role, a computer acts like and is treated as another social
being. The computer may provide social support, model target behaviors or attitudes,
or reward the target with positive feedback. In this way, the target stops thinking of
the computer as a machine and starts looking on it as if it were alive. This role is also
relevant to social engineering in light of some recent articles on bots being used to
conduct chats with humans [22]. The computer displays one or more of five different
social cues to achieve this effect
• Physical
Physical cues can be very wide ranging. It could be something as simple as
the customizable “Office Assistant” that was a part of Microsoft Office 2000
or as complex as the ASIMO robot from Honda shown in Figure 2.3. What is
important is that the technology display some look or behavior that the user
can identify with and therefore assign it the label of “alive”.
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• Psychological
Psychological cues can be anything that directly or indirectly convey feelings,
preferences, or attitudes to the target. An error message that apologizes to the
user is a simple example. The key here is similarity, the computer must be able to
establish some level of similarity with the target. Dr. Fogg conducted a study in
which he paired subjects previously identified as either dominant or submissive
with computers programmed to act in either dominant or submissive manners.
What he found is that the subjects reported more satisfaction in working with
the computers most closely associated to their personality.
• Language
Language cues are also useful for creating a sense of social connection with
computers. Often this is accomplished with a text box of voice response. Simple
text can be used to convey a personality. For example, instead of saying Hello to
a user that logs into a site, it can instead respond with a personalized greeting
that reminds them how long they’ve been away, giving them the feeling of being
missed.
• Social Dynamics
Social Dynamics are unwritten rules pertaining to acceptable patterns of inter-
action. Computers can display these rules of interaction in the form of coercion
or peer pressure. A nag screen that repeatedly asks a user to undertake some
type of action is one example of this. A smartly worded reminder is another.
• Social Roles
A computer can also assume the trappings and thus the importance of various
social roles commonly reserved for humans. For example, a computer can be
assigned the task of handling intake questions during a medical screening. Sur-
prisingly, it is not uncommon for the human respondents to these questions to
treat the computer like it was a doctor in its own right.
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Figure 2.3: An Advertisement From Honda Showing the ASIMO Robot [27]
2.6 Doctrine
The first two foundational questions for this research pertained to the legiti-
macy of social engineering as a weapon for the Air Force and the relation, if any, of
social engineering to the existing concept of Information Operations. These questions
necessitated a review of existing doctrine for information. The review begins at the
Joint level and works down to the Air Force.
2.6.1 Joint Information Operations Doctrine. Joint Publication 3-13, In-
formation Operations (JP 3-13) is the definitive work for the Department of Defense
for describing all aspects of Information Operations (IO). JP 3-13 defines IO as:
the integrated employment of electronic warfare (EW), computer network
operations (CNO), psychological operations (PSYOP), military deception
(MILDEC), and operations security (OPSEC), in concert with specified
supporting and related capabilities, to influence, disrupt, corrupt or usurp
adversarial human and automated decision making while protecting our
own. [44]
This definition contains some key concepts, highlighted here, that will become
useful in chapter 4. First, JP 3-13 describes the integrated employment of the various
components. This implies that no component operates on its own and that only when
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the different elements are operating synergistically does effective IO exist. Second, the
doctrine includes both technical (Computer Network Operations) and non-technical
(OPSEC) elements. This suggests the full use of all elements available. Finally,
the stated goal is to alter an adversaries access to their information system while
simultaneously protecting our own systems. This indicates both an offensive and
defensive component.
2.6.1.1 Information Quality Criteria. JP 3-13 also introduces the
concept of Information Quality Criteria as shown in Figure 2.4.
Figure 2.4: Information Operations Criteria [44]
These criteria are used to quantify the value of the information under discussion.
Different circumstances require varying applications of the criteria. In a situation
where a rapid decision is required, for example, the criteria that may be of the most
value are brevity, completeness, accuracy, relevance, and timeliness. Perhaps security
and usability are less important as long as the information is available.
On the other hand, if the information is to be stored in a computer database
for long term planning purposes, accuracy, relevance, usability, and security might
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warrant more attention. In this application timeliness is not a factor as the planning
process is looking toward the future and can tolerate some delay. Completeness is
similarly not a concern, there will likely be time to incorporate additional pieces of
information as they become available at a later date. The information is going into a
database so brevity is more than likely not a issue. Storage space is relatively cheap
and it is just as easy to store one file as it is five in most applications.
These information quality criteria are useful to the social engineer. The goal
of a social engineering operation can be to affect one or more of these criteria in
the adversaries information domain. Alternatively, these criteria may be affected
tangentially, where they are altered or perceived altered as an unintended consequence
of a social engineering operation.
2.6.1.2 Cultural Considerations. JP 3-13 deals with information op-
erations but in the Introduction it mentions cultural considerations as a factor that
may shape the information environment.
(1) Long-term factors which may shape the information environment
include the various ways by which humans: (a) Organize (nation states,
tribes, families, etc.). (b) Govern. (c) Interact as groups (culture, so-
ciology, religion, etc.). (d) Are regionally influenced (stability, alliances,
economic relationships, etc.). (e) Are technologically advanced. [44]
As a factor, cultural considerations have a large and long lasting impact on
information operations. Cultural considerations have an even larger impact on social
engineering due to its inherently personal nature. While it may not be necessary
to directly interact with the chosen target, the engineer must still understand what
motivates the adversary. In addition, many social engineering techniques involve
impersonating someone else, so the culture of the person being impersonated must be
considered.
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2.6.2 Air Force Doctrine. Working down from the Joint level to the Air
Force Level, Air Force Doctrine Document 2-5, Information Operations (AFDD 2-5).
AFDD 2-5 defines IO as
Information operations (IO) are the integrated employment of the capa-
bilities of influence operations, electronic warfare operations, and network
warfare operations, in concert with specified integrated control enablers,
to influence, disrupt, corrupt, or usurp adversarial human and automated
decision making while protecting our own [21]
There are some subtle differences here from the joint doctrine, most notably the
insertion of Influence Operations to cover the joint doctrine capabilities of Military
Deception (MILDEC), Psychological Operations (PSYOPS) and Operational Security
(OPSEC).
2.6.2.1 Levels of Information Operations. AFDD 2-5 defines three
domains of operation. Figure 2.5 presents a graphical representation of these domains
and their components.
Network Warfare Operations include the capabilities of Network Attack (NetA),
Network Defense (NetD), and Network Warfare Support (NS). NetA is the “employ-
ment of network-based capabilities to destroy, disrupt, corrupt, or usurp information
resident in or transiting through networks” [21].
NetD is the “employment of network-based capabilities to defend friendly infor-
mation resident in or transiting through networks against adversary efforts to destroy,
disrupt, corrupt, or usurp it” [21].
Finally, NS is the “collection and production of network related data for imme-
diate decisions involving NW Ops” [21].
These levels of operations and their specific capabilities are an integral part of
Chapter 4 and are presented here as familiarization only.
2.6.2.2 OODA Loop. Additionally, AFDD 2-5 discusses the OODA
loop. OODA stands for Observe, Orient, Decide, Act and defines the process an
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Figure 2.5: Hierarchical Representation of the Components of Information Opera-
tions as Outlined in AFDD 2-5 [21]
organization or individual goes through when making decisions and taking actions.
It is a continuous process that is described by Figure 2.6
Notice the circular nature of the loop and the various components that influence
its composition. Also notice that there is a time spent in each section as well as a time
spent transitioning to the next phase; this was an intentional element from Col Boyd.
This time is represented by the relative size of each section of the loop. Therefore, an
entity with a fast decision process would be said to have a smaller OODA loop than
another, slower, entity.
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Figure 2.6: Col John Boyd’s OODA loop as he sketched it shortly before his death
[39]
AFDD 2-5 defines decision superiority as “a relationship between adversary and
friendly OODA loop processes” [21]. Therefore, decision superiority is nothing more
than the relative size of the Air Forces OODA loop to an adversaries. The greater
the disparity in that relationship, the greater the decision superiority.
At this point, it must be noted that AFDD 2-5 concerns itself primarily with the
adversary’s OODA loop. It mentions the friendly loop but speaks about Information
Operations only in regards to how it impacts an adversary’s decision process. Social
engineering is unique in that it has the ability to affect both friendly and adversary
loops at the same time. Information gleaned from a social engineering operation may
cause the friendly OODA to accelerate while misinformation planted by the same
operation can decelerate the adversary loop.
2.6.2.3 Information Operation Threats. AFDD 2-5 mentions two dis-
tinct threats to Information Operations. IO threats can be described as structured
or unstructured by looking at their organizational characteristics and purpose [21].
The structured threat could also be considered the nation-state threat as it is well
organized, normally with significant financial backing, objectives and means for in-
filtrating the information environment. However, this threat need not be associated
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with a particular nation; wealthy and well organized criminal and terrorist organiza-
tions could also fall into this category. This threat type usually has specific long term
goals.
The unstructured threat is the opposite. It is usually a small group or an
individual with little backing, politically or monetarily, which have a specific goal.
Interestingly, a person can be part of both an unstructured and structured threat.
Consider the person working for a state-funded Information Warfare unit that inde-
pendently performs a seemingly random information attack. That person is a member
of an organization that poses a structured threat but, through acting on his or her
own has also become an unstructured threat. This attribute of an unstructured threat
makes identify and prosecuting the adversary particulary difficult as it creates a re-
quirement to confirm state sponsorship of any attack before appropriate retaliatory
measures are applied.
2.7 Air Force Pamphlet 14-118
Aerospace Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace (AIPB) is based on In-
telligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB) which is a concept shared with the
Army and outlined in Army Field Manual 34-130 Intelligence Preparation of the Bat-
tlefield [7]. While both concepts are similar, Air Force Pamphlet 14-118, Aerospace
Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace, (AFPAM 14-118) describes the process
specific to the Air Force and is the basis for this research. It places more emphasis
on effects than the process outlined by the Army and is more representative of the
unique domain in which the Air Force operates. The ability to affect all areas of the
battlespace at any given time is what sets the Air Force apart from the other services,
a capability only magnified in Cyberspace.
2.7.1 Portions of AIPB. The AIPB process is a four phase spiral planning
event shown in Figure 2.7.
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Figure 2.7: The Four Pieces of the AIPB Process [20]
The goal is to achieve Predictive Battlespace Awareness (PBA). PBA is the
ability for commanders to choose the effects they wish to cause based on how they
believe the adversary will react. It is not intended to completely predict the future,
rather to provide a better concept of what is likely to happen.
Phase One: Define the Battlespace Environment
The first step in the process seeks to limit the focus to only the battlespace
in question. It starts with a definition of the entire area of interest, all things that
could potentially be a part of the battlespace. Then the scope is contracted until it
only contains the battlespace items of interest in this instance. This is accomplished
by marrying the mission with the quantity and quality of information required to
accomplish that mission.
Phase Two: Describe the Battlespace effects
The battlespace is the third actor in any conflict, along with friendly and ad-
versary forces, so its effect on the outcome of any conflict must be analyzed. The
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primary goal of this phase is to understand how aspects of the battlespace can be
exploited to provide operational advantages or disadvantages.
Phase Three: Evaluate the Adversary
This phase develops a comprehensive view of the adversary. Doctrine, centers
of gravity, capabilities, tactics, techniques and procedures are all examined in order
to establish a complete picture. This phase has the added benefit of forcing the
crystallization of perceived adversary capabilities into products that friendly forces
can use.
Phase Four: Determine Adversary Courses of Action
This step identifies and prioritizes enemy courses of action (COA), taking into
account previously identified centers of gravity. Once identified, these likely COA’s
can be exploited to further shape the battlespace into a form advantageous to accom-
plishment of the mission.
2.8 Summary
This section served as an introduction to concepts that factored heavily into
this research. They will be revisited and made relevant during the discussion of the
research findings. The following chapter discusses the methods used to conduct the
research.
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III. Methodology
There are but two powers in the world, the sword and the mind. In the long run the
sword is always beaten by the mind
–Napoleon Bonaparte
This chapter discusses the methodology behind the research conducted. It will in-troduce and explain the employed methods as well as provide some information
as to why the particular methods were selected. These methods include a literature
review, grounded theory exploration, and the review of course development material.
This research is primarily based on two separate efforts. The first is a literature
review. While providing related background information is common to many research
efforts, it is particularly important to this one as very little in the way of formalized
research has been accomplished in the area of interest. Therefore, one task was
to review as much related material as possible and investigate parallels with other
concepts of interest. This comparative review and analysis forms the basis for this
research effort. Exploring the identified interrelations identified by this research is
our primary contribution.
The second effort follows directly from the first and is the employment of
Grounded Theory. Grounded Theory is a subset of Qualitative Research. Its pri-
mary distinguishing characteristic is its focus on allowing the theory to evolve from
the data in a spiral, evolutionary manner. This method was particularly well suited
to this research as the constant ingestion of new data also spawned a near constant
evolution as to where social engineering fit in those data.
3.1 Research Questions
The original intent of this thesis was to address the simple question “Where if
anywhere, does social engineering fit in the Air Force tool box?” Out of this simple
question, several other, more manageable questions arose which this thesis attempts
to address.
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These are
1. Is Social Engineering a legitimate weapon for the Air Force to consider?
2. Can we demonstrate a link between Social Engineering and Information Oper-
ations?
3. Can a Social Engineering attack be planned and measured?
4. What objectives need to be met to train Social Engineers?
Each of these questions generated an avenue of research.
3.2 Grounded Theory
Grounded Theory is a research technique that was originally introduced in 1967
by Barney Glasser and Anselm Strauss [14]. The original audience for the technique
was the social sciences community as the emphasis is on generating theory from data
through a repetitive reading process.
This theory approaches complex problems, viewing them as whole entities rather
than collections of variables [15]. The entities are observed, normally through reading
but the entities could also be information sources like interviews or observations, and
a general sense of them is established. This sense is further refined through multiple
reviews as well as the addition of other relevant information. After the researcher has
developed an authoritative feel for the subject matter, key concepts are defined and
relationships exposed.
For example, consider the following sentence taken from Joint Publication 3-13
Information operations (IO) are integral to the successful execution of mil-
itary operations
This sentence reveals the key concepts of INFORMATION OPERATIONS and
SUCCESS as well as the relationship between them. Namely that Information Op-
erations is INTEGRAL to success. While seemingly simplistic, it in fact reveals the
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rigidity of the Grounded Theory methodology. Rigidity leads to reproducibility which
in turn creates credibility.
3.3 Grounded Theory Process
Grounded Theory starts with a situation of interest, the research area. The task
of the researcher is to understand what is occurring and why, to uncover relationships
that connect the various pieces of the situation. Constant comparison is the key to
Grounded Theory. At the start of the process, the researcher compares one data set
to another until the beginnings of a theory emerges. This theory is then compared
to more data in an effort to refine and perfect that theory. The desired end state
is a theory that evolved from the data itself so the theory should describe the data
accurately.
Figure 3.1: Classical View of Grounded Theory Process
What really separates Grounded Theory from other research methodologies is
that it is completely emergent. It does not test a hypothesis, it seeks to identify the
hypothesis that accounts for the situation as it currently is. This concept seems a
little free form so to solidify the process, Grounded Theory consists of many steps,
some of which occur simultaneously. Theses steps are:
• Data-Collection
• Note-Taking
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• Coding
• Memoing
• Sorting
• Writing
Data Collection is the start of the process and also serves as the continuity
throughout. The researcher continues to collect data all the way through the process
until all areas of interest are saturated with information. As the researcher progresses
through the Data Collection process, certain key concepts will emerge that must be
kept track of. This is the Note-Taking step. With Data Collection continuing, the
researcher is able to compare key concepts to each other, looking for similarities or
differences that might lead to more data collection. The results of these comparisons
are noted in the margins and become the Coding portion of the process. As the
comparisons continue and their results pile up in the form of coding, theories will
emerge that become apparent to the researcher. These theories can be about links
between key concepts or about an emerging core concept, a concept that is central to
the area of study. The theories are noted down and become the Memoing portion of
the process. Data Collection continues, codes and memos accumulate. At this point,
Sorting begins. Sorting is simply matching like information together in whatever way
makes the most logical sense, whichever produces the greatest clarity of the theory.
The final step, Writing, occurs after all categories are saturated with information and
sorting is complete [12].
3.3.1 Grounded Theory Application in this Research. Adhering to the prin-
ciples of Grounded Theory, this research began with Data Collection. Indeed data
collection, in the form of interviews and literature review, was the single continuous
thread of effort throughout this research. The revised Grounded Theory graphic in
Figure 3.2 illustrates the process as it was applied.
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Figure 3.2: Author’s Alternative Graphical Representation of the Grounded Theory
Process
3.3.2 Legitimacy of Social Engineering. Grounded Theory methodology was
applied to discover that social engineering is a concept already resident in Air Force
doctrine. As is demonstrated in the following chapter, much of the existing doctrine
mentions concepts that can be logically connected to social engineering. These con-
nections are drawn using the iterative nature of the Grounded Theory methodology
as well as transitive relations.
Transitive relation in logic is the binary relation between all elements of some set
such that if A is related to B and B is related to C then A is related to C [2]. Written
in predicate logic, assuming a set X and some relation R, this concept appears as
∀ a, b, c ² X, aRb ∧ bRc⇒ aRc
What this means in relation to this research is that if Air Force doctrine uses
a specific key concept and that key concept is also a part of social engineering, then
Air Force doctrine is expatiating on social engineering in some way.
To draw these logical connectors, specific areas of the doctrine are examined,
highlighting key concepts. Furthermore, case studies of social engineering incidents
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in the civilian sector provide comparable key concept information. When doctrinal
and social engineering concepts are combined, the similarity becomes plain.
3.4 Adaptation Process
The second portion of this research effort is to adapt the existing framework of
Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace for use in planning, executing and mea-
suring the effectiveness of social engineering operations. This effort made heavy use
of inductive logic which is defined as “A process of reasoning that moves from specific
instances to predict general principles” [1]. Inductive logic uses a relatively small
number of observable events to extrapolate laws that apply to the larger system.
However, the observations only suggest the law, they do not ensure it. For example,
after observing several crows over a certain period of time, an observer might note
that the crows are black. Inductive logic could in turn lead the observer to conclude
that all crows are black. The conclusion is not guaranteed but is instead supported
by observations.
Inductive reasoning is widely used in the area of legal discourse where it is com-
monly applied in cases of precedence [50]. In this instance, previous rulings that can
be demonstratively shown to be similar to the current case are used as foundational
pieces. The key portions from that foundation are then applied to the specific case at
hand. This also illustrates the another characteristic of inductive reasoning, moving
from general observations to specific applications.
Adapting Aerospace Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace to a framework
useful for measuring battle damage caused by social engineering, and indeed all other
cyber attacks, is an exercise in inductive reasoning. Areas of this IPB framework that
appear to have a direct application to the research are utilized.
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3.5 Battle Damage Assessment
The solution suggested for accomplishing battle damage assessment is based
on an existing framework, Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace, which uses
an effects-based outlook to accurately predict what an adversary might do or how
the battlespace might change. The method attempts to predict the adversary reac-
tion when presented with a particular situation, the goal being to “predict” how the
battlespace and the enemy will change based on friendly activities.
Noticing the obvious usefulness of this concept, this research applies this effects
based reasoning to cyber attacks, specifically social engineering attacks. However,
the concept is approached from the other end of the spectrum. Instead of asking
the question “How might an adversary react to this action” as a way of predicting
what the battlespace will look like in the future, the same question is posed with
an eye towards evaluation. Instead of trying to predict what an adversary will do in
order to gain better situational awareness, the process is applied to develop observable
indicators that a taken action was effective.
In order to formalize this process, predictive statistical models of behavior were
considered. Modeling human behavior, which is a large part of what the proposed
Battle Damage Assessment framework attempts to accomplish, is a complex prob-
lem of inferring unobservable information from observable actions [51]. In the past
and even in the Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace process this solution is
adapted from, prediction of human behavior has been based on a hand-built knowledge
databases. These information stores were essentially historical anecdotes of behav-
iors that precipitated reactions in the subject under question. They relied heavily on
both builder input and the predictor’ s ability to draw logical parallels between past
situations and current events. In addition, these knowledge stores were not scalable
and not tolerant of corrupted, distorted, inaccurate or otherwise unintelligible data.
A solution to the high resource demands and low fault tolerance of the knowledge
base building method described in Air Force Pamphlet 14-118 is a predictive statistical
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model. These models routinely fall into one of two categories, categorized by how they
learn: content-based or collaborative [51].
Content-based learning is preferable when past behavior is determined to be a
reliable predictor of future behavior. This approach builds a model of future sub-
ject actions based on past actions. This approach is specific to an individual (note:
individual may mean an individual organization if the behavior of an organization
can be accurately characterized over time) and is limited when a new situation is
encountered. The heavy reliance on past behavior makes this approach poorly suited
to situations when the subject finds him/her self in a new situation with no past
behavior to draw on.
Collaborative learning is preferable when it is reasonable to assume that a given
subject will behave similarly to other, like-minded subjects in a particular situation.
This method is specific to a particular user or group but does not gather all its
data from that user or group as content-based learning does. In this way, it is more
flexible when encountering new situations as the behavior of the larger group, which
the subject is a member, can serve as the historical example in the new situation
provided enough data is collected to accurately categorize the subject’s membership.
Predictive statistical models were not used in this thesis due to time constraints
but are mentioned here as the model was built with the goal of being able to employ
one. Therefore, this area is relegated to a potential future research area and is noted
as such in Chapter 5.
3.6 Training
Having established the legitimacy of social engineering, the next logical step
was to develop the beginnings of a training plan to bring this capability to the Air
Force. Towards that end, the final piece of this research is to review the applicable
course development guidelines and prepare objectives for training social engineers.
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These objectives were created through use of the Grounded Theory process.
Key tasks are identified as a starting point. An iterative and expansive literature
review is conducted, looking for other key tasks in order to build as complete a list
as possible. With the task listing built, the next step is to identify specific skills,
knowledge or attitudes that are required in order to perform the tasks. This listing
draws heavily on any anecdotal evidence available. Finally, specific objectives are
created that, if met, would ensure the trainees possed the desired skills, knowledge,
and attitudes.
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IV. Results: Doctrine, Battle Damage Assessment Model,
and Training
Violence is the first refuge of the incompetent
–Isaac Asimov
This chapter presents and discusses the results of the literature review along witha suggested method for conducting Battle Damage Assessment (BDA) of any
social engineering operation and the beginnings of a training program. Since the focus
of this research is social engineering, the BDA framework presented has a specific and
noticeable bias towards this attack vector. However with little adaptation, suitable
applications can be found to almost any cyber based attack. The goal of this literature
review is to inductively prove that social engineering is a legitimate attack method
for Air Force consideration by showing that Air Force Doctrine already incorporates
common elements. This is accomplished by showing that social engineering, while
not specifically mentioned in any doctrine, shares many of its key components with
the concepts formalized doctrine discusses at length. Through application of the
transitive property, the link is drawn between what is currently considered acceptable
components of Information Operations and social engineering.
4.1 Social Engineering and the OODA Loop
From an Air Force perspective, no discussion about information processing and
decision making is complete without discussing the OODA loop. OODA stands for
Observe, Orient, Decide and Act and is the framework for viewing the decision making
process originally postulated by Col John Boyd to describe fighter engagements which
was then broadened to decision making as a whole [39]. Typical discussion of the
OODA loop focuses on “shortening” our own or disrupting or “getting inside the
adversary’s”.
Any doubt about the preeminence of the OODA loop is removed on the fourth
page of Air Force Doctrine Document 2-5 (AFDD 2-5), Information Operations, which
states that bringing the three portions of Information Operations, influence opera-
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Figure 4.1: Col John Boy’d OODA Loop
tions, electronic warfare operations, and network operations, to bear on the OODA
loop is the overarching goal of Information Operations [21]. In other words, the total
impact of Information Operations can be viewed as how its three elements create
effects on the OODA loop of friendly and adversary forces.
Social engineering has an interesting effect on the OODA loop that other infor-
mation operations do not. Social engineering has the potential to shorten the OODA
loop of friendly forces while simultaneously lengthening the loop of the adversary. As
stated earlier, social engineering can take many forms and has potential for combined
impact. In a situation where a social engineering campaign has effected a compro-
mise of system access, the OODA loop on the friendly side is shortened by having
better insight into what information the adversary holds; that is being better able to
Observe and Orient. That access can also be used to inject misinformation into the
adversary data stream thereby causing a lengthening of the Observation and Orien-
tation portions of the their loop. Similarly, an unsuccessful social engineering attack
can produce these results by engendering mistrust of information in the adversary,
causing them to second guess and question information which is available to them.
Reaching back to the Information Quality Criteria reviewed in Chapter 2, even an
unsuccessful attack can affect the value of information. Friendly forces, having caused
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this disruption, would remain unaffected and indeed could benefit as some of these
effects may be anticipated.
This unique attribute of social engineering can create a rapid state of decision
superiority. AFDD 2-5 defines decision superiority as the relationship between adver-
sary and friendly OODA loops [21]. By degrading one and enhancing the other with
the same operation, friendly forces advance towards the desired state of superiority
in one step rather than two.
4.2 Influence Operations
AFDD 2-5 defines three domains that influence Information Operations. Figure
4.2 presents a graphical representation of these domains.
Figure 4.2: Domains of Information Operations [21]
Social engineering has a direct effect on two of these domains, the cognitive and
information domains, with the potential for affecting the third. As explained earlier,
social engineering operates in the cognitive domain, that is, in the realm of thought.
It is mental sleight of hand, an attempt to convince a target to think something
that may not be entirely accurate. Information is the objective of social engineering,
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either in terms of system access and the associated knowledge that comes with that
access or through knowledge gained about some adversary system of interest. Social
engineering is flexible enough that an operation conventionally viewed as failed could
in fact reveal vital information. Potential for affecting the third, physical, domain
comes in light of a demonstration produced for the Homeland Security Agency in
which a generator was caused to self destruct by being fed attack commands over the
network to which it was connected [41]. Social engineering will not produce an effect
like this directly although it could provide the access to the network which would
enable this type of action.
4.3 Social Engineering and the Information Operations Capabilities
The three capabilities, Influence Operations, Electronic Warfare Operations,
and Network Operations, that comprise Information Operations must necessarily con-
tain all things considered Information Operations. If an activity is considered an in-
formation operation, it must fit one or more of the three capabilities that together
form the sum total of Information Operations. Therefore, working from the premise
that social engineering is in fact a variety of information operation, it must reside in
one or more of these capabilities.
The obvious choice is influence operations. As mentioned earlier, social engi-
neers work through methods of persuasion. Persuade and influence are actually syn-
onyms [16] so Influence Operations is the correct place to start. Influence Operations
are further broken down into capabilities of Counter Propaganda, Psychological Op-
erations (PSYOP), Military Deception (MILDEC), Operations Security (OPSEC),
Counterintelligence (CI) Operations and Public Affairs (PA). Social engineering is
inherently misleading and therefore does not belong in PA [21]. OPSEC is chiefly
concerned with the protection of friendly information rather than the discovery and
exploitation of adversary information [44] and therefore will not be used in this dis-
cussion. Similarly, CI and Counter Propaganda Operations are primarily defensive,
seeking to protect friendly assets against the espionage and intelligence activities of an
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Figure 4.3: Hierarchical representation of the Information Operation capabilities
and their associated elements [21]
adversary [21]. Social engineering as an activity is inherently offensive in nature and
therefore does not fit well into any activity with protection or denial as its primary
purpose.
This process of elimination leaves the capabilities of PSYOP and MILDEC
under the umbrella capability of Influence Operations. PSYOP is a natural sibling of
social engineering as its primary target is the cognitive domain of the adversary [21].
In contrast to MILDEC which is discussed shortly, PSYOP seeks to create influence
or reinforce favorable ideas whereas MILDEC seeks to mislead or deceive. Although
both influence the decision process of an adversary in similar ways.
42
4.4 Social Engineering in the Doctrine
Having identified potential siblings of social engineering in the doctrine, this
section illuminates similarities to solidify the proposed links. Starting with a famous
PSYOP operation example which took place during Operation Desert Storm in 1991,
key characteristics in PSYOP and MILDEC are connected to techniques used by
social engineers.
The PSYOP example in Figure 4.4 evidences a key characteristic, the reinforce-
ment of a perceived truth favorable to friendly forces. The truth is that friendly
aircraft operate at will, targeting adversary forces with impunity and is implicit in
the declaration that a specific unit will be tomorrow’s target. This statement carries
less influence if the adversary does not believe in the statements veracity. In this case,
it is a reasonably close fit to the truth as the adversary perceives it and so has more
impact. Basing PSYOP operations in truth generates more impact.
Figure 4.4: Roughly translates to “This is your first and last warning, the 16th
Infantry Division will be bombed tomorrow”. Originally dropped during Operation
Desert Storm in 1991.
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Military deception affects the adversary’s decision process by causing them to
use faulty information as the basis for their decision cycle [21]. World War II’s Op-
eration MINCEMEAT is a famous example of MILDEC [33]. The operation involved
dropping the body of a supposed British Officer into the Mediterranean Ocean off
the coast of Spain. This officer, Maj William Martin, was in fact entirely fictional,
the identity created to go on top of the body of a 34-year old male who had died
of pneumonia. Maj Martin was brought to life with a thorough background legend
complete with pictures of his fiancee and ticket stubs from movies he had attended.
Also on his person when he was found in the water was a briefcase, chained to him,
containing documents suggesting the long anticipated invasion of southern Europe by
the Allies was planned for Sardinia and not Sicily as previously thought by the Axis
powers. Despite objections by the Italians, the Germans accepted this misinformation
and refused other evidence to the contrary, even after the Allies landed in Sicily.
There are several key concepts here. First, the operation required a total dedi-
cation to detail. Aside from the props placed on the body, Maj Martin had paperwork
generated in his name and was even placed on the next list of deceased soldiers pub-
lished by the British. This detail was essential as it was later discovered that the
Germans had checked many of these points when they got access to the body and
the documents. Second, the operation allowed the enemy to discover the informa-
tion rather than feeding it to them. Placing the body in the water was risky for the
British; they could not be certain it would get into German hands. However, they
understood that in order to present the most authenticity, it had appear to be an
actual discovery. Finally, commitment to the deception was total. Even after getting
the body back from the Spanish (who ensured the Germans viewed it and its attached
paperwork before returning it), the British buried the body under the false identity
as shown in Figure 4.5. Indeed, it took until 1996 for an amateur historian by the
name of Roger Morgan to discover evidence suggesting that Maj Martin was indeed
a homeless Welsh man named Glyndwr Michael [11].
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Figure 4.5: Picture of the Grave of Major Martin/Glyndwr Michael [47]
These same concepts are visible in the realm of social engineering. As stated
above, a key element of a successful PSYOP is that it be rooted in truth. Kevin
Mitnick includes a section detailing the various weapons in the arsenal of a social
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engineer in his book The Art of Intrusion. One of these weapons is trappings of the
role [32]. Trappings of the role is simply affecting characteristics that a person would
expect someone in the claimed position to posses. For example, wearing a nice suit if
claiming to be an executive or speaking with a slight drawl if claiming to be calling
from the south. These small touches of truth reinforce the perception that all the
information presented is the truth.
Attention to detail, the second concept and evidenced in the MILDEC example,
is also important to the social engineer. The Art of Intrusion recounts the story of a
man hired to do a security audit on a casino in Las Vegas. As background for this
job, the man spent a week doing research before even heading out to the site. When
he identified a potential target, he was able to ask her out to dinner where he gave
her the background story of his assumed persona, complete with university attended
and a fictitious recent break-up with a girlfriend [32]. Later, when he attempted to
penetrate the casino with the information he gleaned, he made sure to dress the part
of the junior executive he was claiming to be, even noting that the color of his suit
was blue, a color he believed associated with trustworthiness. Like the creators of
Operation Mincemeat, this individual knew details create the story.
The third concept noted was the adversary was allowed to discover the informa-
tion on their own, making it appear more valid. Again turning to Kevin Mitnick, this
time in his book The Art of Deception, there is a parallel example in social engineer-
ing. In this case, the attacker began by cold calling a company, claiming to be from
the help desk and warning users of an outage. He gave out his cell phone number to
those people in case they did experience an outage. What they did not know is that
he had put mechanisms in place that caused an outage, and when it happened, they
called the cell phone number of the friendly help desk employee that warned them of
this possibility. During his help session with them, he got the individuals to down-
load and run a small application on their machine under the guise of troubleshooting.
When this did not fix the problem as he knew it would not, he walked them through
the steps of erasing it. So he was able to get the users to download an application,
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run it, and then erase it. During this process, the users remained convinced that they
were talking to their help desk and that this person on the other end of the line was
trying to assist them [31].
The final concept is total commitment to the fabrication that the social engineer
has created. Turning back to the man hired to do a security penetration test on a
casino in Las Vegas, there is an example of this as well. This man was in an office
he should not have been in and was “caught” by a security employee. The employee
did what he was supposed to do and challenged the individual about their right to
be where they were. Instead of admitting defeat, this person used the event to their
advantage by admitting to some but not all of what the security person suspected.
This broke the momentum of the guard and ended up defusing the situation [32].
Figure 4.1 summarizes the discussion of these key concepts.
Table 4.1: Comparison of Influence Operations and Social Engineering Traits
Influence Operation Characteristic Social Engineering Technique
Deception rooted in truth Knowing the lingo, Name dropping
Commitment to the deception Dressing the part, Acting as if
Attention to detail Cold reading, Establishing friendship
Planted information Masquerading as help desk, Causing catastrophes
Many elements of social engineering appear in Influence Operations under the
umbrella of Information Operations. Using the transitive property, if Influence Op-
erations are a part of Information Operations and social engineering shares many
similarities with Influence Operations, then social engineering is a part of Informa-
tion Operations.
4.5 Battle Damage Assessment
One of the keys for any military operation is to be able to assess the effectiveness
of that operation after the fact. As succinctly stated by Gen Norman Schwartzkopf
in his book It Doesn’t Take a Hero
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...too much optimism could prompt us to launch the ground war too soon,
at the cost of many lives; too much pessimism could cause us to sit wringing
our hands and moaning that the enemy was still too strong [42].
Stated another way, knowing what effect prior actions have had on an adversary is
necessary to chose the right moment for further action. It also indicates whether more
of the same type of action is required, if a desired state of affairs has been achieved,
before proceeding to the next set of objectives.
This research noted this need for a method to conduct Battle Damage Assess-
ment (BDA) on social engineering attacks. Through application of the Grounded
Theory process, Aerospace Intelligence of the Battlefield emerged as a likely frame-
work. The actual methodology of IPB was described in an earlier chapter so this
chapter focuses on the ways in which it is adapted to fit in a BDA role. First, a quick
discussion on the reasoning behind why this framework was chosen.
4.6 The Decision to Use AIPB
BDA is essentially a function of expectations. Dropping a bomb, the expectation
is that whatever is hit will be destroyed and success is measured by that expectation. If
reconnaissance of the target after the attack reveals it to be still intact expectations
have not been met and BDA indicates that the item needs to be targeted again.
Taken out to its fullest extent, this idea indicates that BDA is nothing more than
seeing how well the observed state matches the anticipated state given a set of actions.
Extrapolating this concept to the cyber realm and more specifically, social engineering,
AIPB formed the basis for a method to plan, execute and evaluate a social engineering
attack.
The immediately noticeable drawback is that AIPB is a lengthy and labor in-
tensive process, often begun well in advance of the coming conflict. It relies on large
databases of information that are compiled and referenced by hand [20]. This method
of operation is not acceptable given the speed with which information operations take
place. While the model is sound, the prescribed method of execution is too cumber-
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some to be effective. Therefore, it is streamlined into as few steps as possible while
keeping the core intent in place.
4.7 Aerospace Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace
Interestingly, the AIPB process introduced in AFPAM 14-118 is based on the
Army process known simply as Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield. It may seem
redundant to develop a whole new service specific process but this makes sense. Each
service views its role in its primary domain differently which necessitates different
doctrine to maximize domination of that domain.
For instance, the Navy views their sea power dominance as something they
always maintain. They leave port dominating the area in which they operate and
as they travel to their final destination, they carry that domination with them [36].
This view is similar to the Army in that the Navy maintains physical control over a
certain geographic area, identify and categorizing all actors that come into that area
as friendly or hostile, but differs in that the area of this control remains fixed. As
the Navy travels, it is constantly taking in new area it needs to control while leaving
behind area that it no longer needs to control, like a bubble sliding over the water.
The Army on the other hand generally has to create and enlarge its area of
dominance. It arrives in an area of operation, creates dominance over the domain
and then pushes forward. The key difference is that their area of control does not
remain constant, it increases or decreases depending on the movement of forces. This
is due to the logistics tail a land army necessarily has which means they not only have
to control new area but they have to maintain control over all areas to their rear [8].
Both of these approaches are clearly different than the way the Air Force views
its domain of operations. The Air Force in fact does not focus on control; it focuses
on effects although achieving control over the air is a way to ensure that the Air Force
can create the effects it desires at will [4].
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Given these different methods for viewing the primary domains of operation,
and the differing implementations of processes, it follows that cyberspace as a newly
defined domain will require its own version of the IPB process, tailored to its specific
attributes.
The AIPB process has four components as described in Chapter 2. Likewise,
the adapted process contains the same four components although the steps in each
component are modified according to the demands of the domain. For review, these
components are:
• Define the Battlespace in the Environment
• Describe the Battlespace Effects
• Evaluate the Adversary
• Determine Adversary Courses of Action
4.7.1 Define the Battlespace in the Environment. Joint Publication 3-13
defines cyberspace as “the notional environment in which digitized information is
communicated over computer networks” [44]. This encompasses quite a large potential
area of operation, so the first step of the process is to narrow down the scope to
something manageable. The purpose is to set boundaries on the problem and identify
specific areas and features of the environment for further analysis.
For social engineering, this is a four step process:
Table 4.2: 4 Steps to Define the Cyber Battlespace Environment
Step Title
1 Analyze the Mission
2 Identify Limits of Operational Area and Determine Possible Second Order Effects
3 Identify Knowledge Gaps and Set Priorities on Resolution
4 Collect Required Information to Complete Process
4.7.1.1 Analyze the Mission. Review higher headquarters and local
objectives in order to gain familiarity with the desired end state. Source material for
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this phase can come from a wide variety of areas. Anything from National Military
Strategy to local estimates of the situation may be used to enhance the battlespace
picture. In some cases, information gathered may range beyond the scope of the
current operation. This is acceptable as long as the information contributes to a
more thorough understanding of the situation. The desired product from this phase
is a full understanding of the mission requirements and the constraints the commander
is operating under.
4.7.1.2 Identify Limits of Operational Area and Determine Possible Sec-
ond Order Effects. This begins the process of scoping the mission. Creating a
well defined Operational Area ensures that elements outside of our control or con-
cern are not included in the planing process. However, it is important to remain
aware of the area outside the defined Operational Area in order to accurately predict
possible second order effects. Second order effects are the unintended consequences
of some intentional action. Guidance for determining the scope comes from specific
commanders objectives and Rules of Engagement.
4.7.1.3 Identify Knowledge Gaps and Set Priorities on Resolution.
In this phase what is and is not known about the Operational Area should become
evident. If any mission critical information is missing it should be identified. Missing
information is deemed critical if it is essential to the mission that was completely
described in the first phase. After the gaps have been identified, prioritize their
resolution knowing in all likelihood several will not be resolved at the time of mission
execution. To meet this constraint, different methods of prioritization such as utilizing
a knapsack algorithm may be desirable. The desired product from this phase is a
prioritized list of required information.
4.7.1.4 Collect Required Information to Complete Process. As time
allows, collect the missing information in accordance with the prioritized list created
in the previous phase. In reality, the collection of information is a continuous process.
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The desired product from this phase is a more complete view of the mission and items,
both friendly and adversary, that impact that mission.
4.7.2 Describe the Battlespace Effects. This section of the process analyzes
the battlespace for effects on adversary forces. It seeks to identify areas of advantage
and vulnerability in order to more accurately predict how the battlespace affects both
conflict contestants. The desired product from this section is a thorough understand-
ing of the how the battlespace could influence the mission and courses of action for
friendly and adversary forces. For social engineering, this is a three step process:
Table 4.3: 3 Steps to Describe Battlespace Effects
Step Title
1 Analyze the Physical Enviornment
2 Analyze the Human Dimension
3 Describe Effects of These Two Elements on Friendly and Adversary Operations
4.7.2.1 Analyze the Physical Environment. Analyzing the physical
environment includes reviewing everything from geography and climate to equipment
and facilities. Anything that has a physical form but interacts in some way with the
cyberspace domain inside the Operational Area is included in this analysis, keeping
in mind not to neglect space assets and weather. Key questions include but are not
limited to the following:
• What assets does the adversary have and how may they be employed?
• What is the weather forecast during the planned time of the mission?
• What political boundaries are in play?
• What are the physical connections to the target system?
• What physical limitations do we have? power constraints, HVAC constraints?
The goal is to fully understand the role of the physical environment on the
mission.
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4.7.2.2 Analyze the Human Dimension. This incorporates all elements
not already accounted for in the physical domain. Included are political factors,
centers of gravity, international alliances, socio-cultural considerations, psychological
dispositions, economic situations, demographics and quality of life. The goal is to
fully understand what motivates adversary forces and how those motivations change
with time and pressure. It is important to note this analysis may be required on a
host nation if friendly forces are operating from inside their borders. Understanding
the impacts of planned activities on the country providing a base of operations is an
important and potentially volatile concern. Losing host nation support could turn a
tactical success into a strategic failure.
4.7.2.3 Describe the Effects of the Physical Environment and Human
Dimension on Friendly and Adversary Operations. Now that both the physical and
the human environments are understood, they are applied against planned operations.
If previous efforts to fully analyze both environments have not been thorough, the
lacking areas will be exposed in this step.
4.7.3 Evaluate the Adversary. The purpose of this step is to gain a better
understanding of the adversary. Review their Centers of Gravity (COG), capabilities
and limitations, doctrine, tactics, and techniques and procedures (TTP). In addition,
evaluate their cultural attitudes, looking for indicators that make courses of action
more or less likely. For social engineering, this becomes a three step process:
Table 4.4: 3 Steps to Evaluate the Adversary
Step Title
1 Identify and Analyze Adversary Centers of Gravity
2 Identify Applicable Cultural Nuances and Asses their Impact
3 Describe Current Adversary Situation
4.7.3.1 Identify and Analyze Adversary Centers of Gravity. This seeks
to identify the vulnerabilities in the adversary’s COG. A COG is a source of power,
some characteristic that a particular organization, be it public or private, derives
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strength from. It can be tangible like a monument or a financial district or intangible
like freedoms a populace holds dear. In conducting this step, the purpose is to identify
exploitable vulnerabilities in the COG where possible. When not possible, the goal
is to identify and remain cognizant of the COG throughout this process. It is also
possible for a particular course of action to have a center of gravity.
4.7.3.2 Identify Applicable Cultural Nuances and Assess Their Impact.
This step is vitally important to the social engineer. As identified earlier, details
like cultural customs, norms and nuances are often the details that create a successful
operation. The social engineer needs to understand the frame of mind of the adversary,
what motivates him and how far he will go before feeling threatened. This step
also includes identifying dialects and appropriate slang which can successfully add a
more authentic feel to the communication. Finally, collect information about popular
current events in the area. Items such as political news, sports news and weather can
set an adversary at ease and create the level of authenticity desired.
4.7.3.3 Describe Current Adversary Situation. This step illuminates
the current status of the adversary, matching assets with their locations, purposes and
availabilities. Adversary assets particularly important to the accomplishment of the
friendly mission, termed high value targets (HVT), are identified. Finally, attempt
to predict adversary reaction to the loss of each indicated HVT, what behaviors they
might display if this asset were lost. This effort is influenced by nuances specific to
the adversary and so draws heavily on the understanding generated in the previous
phase.
4.7.4 Formulate Mission Execution Plan and Determine Adversary Courses of
Action. This solidifies the operational plan and adds an anticipatory element for
use in BDA. This step identifies, prioritizes, and weights enemy Courses of Action
(COA) taking into account the factors and variables noted in the previous three
steps. For social engineering, this step has two purposes depending on the situation
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confronting the commander. The first purpose is reactionary and seeks to identify
what adversary response is likely if friendly forces initiate conflict. The second purpose
is proactive and looks at all possible adversary COAs, identifying a small subset which
are particularly advantageous to friendly forces and working backwards to find actions
that would induce the adversary to pursue those COAs. For social engineering, this
is a five step process:
Table 4.5: 5 Steps to Formulate Mission Execution Plan and Determine Adversary
COA
Step Title
1 Explicitly Identify Assumptions
2 Finalize Mission Plan
3 Identify Adversary Courses of Action and Desired End State
4 Weight COA
5 Identify Required Intelligence Assets Needed to Measure COA
4.7.4.1 Explicitly Identify Assumptions. Friendly forces are working
from an imperfect view of the adversary. While this planning process removes much
of the fog of war, it is impossible to have total knowledge of what an adversary plans
or will likely do. Realization of this shortcoming leads to a certain amount of best-
guessing, making assumptions about the situation based on information and observed
prior behavior. These assumptions are unavoidable but should be noted. The goal is
to explicitly identify these assumptions in order to keep them in proper perspective.
4.7.4.2 Finalize Mission Plan. Drawing on the information gathered
in the previous steps, draft the final plan to accomplish the mission objective. Review
plan for last minute additions or subtractions keeping in mind that the plan must
remain flexible in order to remain viable.
4.7.4.3 Identify Adversary Courses of Action and Desired End State.
This brainstorming step identifies all possible adversary COAs in response to the
planned mission. There is no concern for the likelihood these COAs will occur, simply
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identify as many as are logical given the current circumstances. Consider everything
a possibility.
Begin to narrow the list by identifying the adversary’s desired end state, the
situation they are most likely to attempt to attain. This will automatically eliminate
those unrealistic COA, leaving only possible outcomes.
4.7.4.4 Weight COA. This step takes the remaining, realistic, COAs
and assigns a weight value to them in order to establish a probabilistic set of out-
comes. Each COA is weighted by the number of indicators friendly forces currently
have that the adversary COA is possible. For instance, if the course of action under
consideration is the adversary will deploy more troops to a specific location, indica-
tors could be items like reports transport trucks have begun to move, that adversary
TTPs prescribe this procedure or historically this has been their response. These are
all indicators of the particular COA and contribute to its weight.
Alternatively, a COA may be weighted more heavily based on a single indicator
if it is the assertion of a subject matter expert if this is warranted. Using the same
troop movement as an example, if the only indicator currently available is a TTP
which states this troop movement will take place, additional value is assigned to this
COA if it is believed that it will take place even though a single piece of information
supports that assertion. Ultimately, the decision to add this additional weight or not
falls to the mission commander.
4.7.4.5 Identify Required Intelligence Assets Needed to Measure COA.
This final step matches the most likely adversary COA with friendly forces ability
to measure them. This is the heart of the Battle Damage Assessment for a social
engineering operation. The weighted list of COAs provides expectations and BDA
is simply checking expectations against reality. Reconnaissance assets are tasked to
observe the expected adversary COA in order to determine success or failure.
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Not having expectations and reality match is not necessarily a sign of a failed
mission. Social engineering operates in the cognitive domain which introduces a
measure of unpredictability and uncertainty this process is unable to eliminate.
4.8 Training Social Engineers
The third and final piece of this research is to develop a preliminary outline for
a program to train social engineers for the Air Force. This answers the final thesis
question “What objectives need to be met to train Social Engineers?” The intention
is not to provide a comprehensive training system for social engineers, which is beyond
both the scope and expertise of this research, but rather to provide guidelines and
examples of key elements of a successful training program, forming a starting point
for its future creation.
This outline was created in accordance with AFMAN 36-2234 and the Instruc-
tional System Development (ISD) process outlined therein. Additionally, Air Force
Handbook 36-2235 and Air Education and Training Command Instruction 36-2203
were consulted for supplemental guidance. Use of the ISD process is mandated in
Air Force Policy Document 36-22 [5]. The ISD process consists of four interrelated
phases. The third and fourth phases of Development and Implementation have been
omitted from this research as the goal was to demonstrate viability of the concept
rather than present a full training solution. Furthermore, ISD provides a mechanism
for determining the need for instruction before beginning preparation of the training.
This research operated from the assumption this training is indeed required and so
omits that beginning phase of the process.
The first two phases, Analysis and Design, are introduced with a short descrip-
tion in general terms of the key components. Then each component is expanded and
focused on the specific task of training social engineers.
4.8.1 Analysis Phase. The analysis phase requires the identification of
job performance requirements and ties them to a task list. These are tasks someone
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Figure 4.6: ISD process currently used by the Air Force [3]
proficient in the job would be able to accomplish. Ideally, this task list is compared to
the skills, knowledge and abilities of the incoming students. However, the development
of a method for ascertaining these factors in incoming students is outside the scope of
this research. Therefore, it is assumed all students have some fixed level of knowledge,
basically aiming training towards bringing the lowest probable level up to acceptable
standards.
4.8.1.1 Job Performance Requirements. A student well trained in so-
cial engineering will be able to apply social engineering techniques in a given situation.
Referring back to the discussion in Chapter 2, those techniques are:
• Trappings of Role
• Credibility
• Altercasting
• Distracting from Systematic Thinking
• Momentum of Compliance
• Desire to Help
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• Attribution
• Liking
• Fear
• Reactance
4.8.1.2 Task Listing Development. The most logical way to develop
the task listing is to look at the techniques and catalog the tasks required to perform
each one individually. Figure 4.7 shows a summarized encapsulation of this effort. In
full, this involved implementation of the Grounded Theory process and several pages
of notes. It began with reading the descriptions of the various techniques listed in
the book in order to gain familiarity with the definitions. Included were examples
from Mitnick’s previous book The Art of Deception which added further flesh to the
bones of the concept. The referenced sections were read in full, getting a more full
sense of what specific actions the attacker took in each example. This process of data
collection was accompanied at every stage with note taking.
Other sources of information on social engineering were incorporated, noting as
was mentioned earlier that many of the technique descriptions given matched some of
the techniques provided by Mr. Mitnick. Accounts used included but are not limited
to [48] [9] [45] [34] [18] [10] [24] [35] [38]. This literature review created many notes
on the relevant elements which were then sorted into the appropriate categories based
on the technique used rather than the name given.
This iterative process led to a full understanding of the social engineering tech-
niques as well as what key tasks the social engineer performs when utilizing each
technique.
4.8.1.3 Minimum Level of Skills and Knowledge Required to Perform
Tasks. Using the task listing in Figure 4.7, the key skills and knowledge required
to accomplish the tasks are interpreted. A few skills became immediately apparent.
The social engineer should be comfortable talking to people, be comfortable with what
59
Figure 4.7: Key Tasks Summarized Based on the Techniques Established by Kevin
Mitnick
is typically termed small talk. They need to be able to read the current situation and
react to it. They need technical proficiency in order to know what exploits are possible
in a given situation. They must demonstrate attention to detail and understand the
point of view/culture/background of the target. Table 4.8 outlines these key points
and others.
It is apparent after listing the skills and knowledge that there is some redun-
dancy; some items appear in multiple locations in one variation or another. Thus,
the skill and knowledge listing is reduced down to 12 components as shown in Figure
4.9. These form the basis for the objectives created as part of the Design Phase.
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Figure 4.8: Summarization of Key Skills and Knowledge Based per Technique
4.8.2 Design Phase. The design phase creates a plan of instruction to
include selecting the instruction methods and media. Any existing documents are
reviewed to determine their continued applicability to the planned instruction. Ob-
jectives are solidified and an implementation plan is drafted for rolling out the new
curriculum. Note that in this application, literature review played a role in every
stage of development. This was a direct result of utilizing the ISD process inside the
Grounded Theory research method.
4.8.2.1 Objective Creation. The objectives flow directly from the
previously identified key skills and knowledge required in order to adequately perform
the task assigned. Specifically,
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Figure 4.9: Process of Developing Training Plan
An objective is a precise statement of the learned capability–skills knowl-
edge or attitudes (SKA)– a student is expected to be able to demonstrate,
the condition under which the SKA is the be exhibited, and the minimum
standard of acceptable performance [3]
.
Following is a list of the 12 identified essential skills along with sample objectives
for each. These objectives meet the criteria referenced above. Note that Understand-
ing Systematic Thought and Sources of Psychological Pressure have been included
underneath Knowing Roles of Behavior.
Dress and Appearance
• From any source available to the student, present elements of personal appear-
ance that would be advantageous in the situation assigned by the instructor. At
a minimum, the student must present three elements that are appropriate to the
assigned situation. These elements may not be reused in further assignments.
• From any print or electronic periodical available, present to the entire class one
element of personal dress and appearance per week. For the purposes of this
objective, this element may be anything related to current clothing or grooming
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trends. Students are encouraged to consider trends in other cultures. The brief
will last no longer than 5 minutes.
Technical Proficiency
• Using tools provided by the instructor, exploit the target system within the
assigned time frame. Success is determined by system compromise.
• Given the instructor provided scenario, present a plan for exploiting the sys-
tem in as few steps as possible. Success is determined by system compromise
although extra credit may be awarded for brevity.
Situational Awareness
• Tests provided by instructor ask the student to compare two similar images and
find as many differences as possible. Passing grade is identifying at least 70%
of the dissimilarities.
• Periodic “pop-quizzes” will be administered by the instructor. Without looking
around, the student will be asked to identify and describe some item in their
immediate area. Success is determined by completeness of the description. Stu-
dents must be able to perform this task to the instructors satisfaction when
asked.
Broad General Knowledge, Current Events
• Using any mainstream print or electronic newspaper available (i.e. CNN, New
York Times, Washington Post), instructors will prepare a 10 question quiz for
the students. Questions must be related to items of national or international
interest including but not limited to politics, current events, weather, sports,
and economics. Passing grade is 70%.
• Using any mainstream print or electronic newspaper available (i.e. CNN, New
York Times, Washington Post), read at least one article about foreign affairs
not covered in class.
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Identify Personality Types Based on Interaction
• Using scenarios presented by the instructor, correctly identify at least three
personality characteristics in each situation.
• Using the same scenarios, identify at least one event that could change your
assessment of the personality type.
Know Roles of Behavior
• Without the use of notes, list all characteristics of systematic thought.
• Without the use of notes, identify sources of psychological pressure.
Conversational Proficiency
• Identify all methods of starting or sustaining a conversation.
• Without use of notes, describe to include examples, methods of mirroring back-
ground, interests and hobbies.
Psychology of Helping
• Without using notes, students will identify all psychological benefits related to
“helping”.
• Without using notes, students will provide at least one situational example for
each benefit.
Cultural Sensitivity and Awareness
• Students will read and present one article per week regarding matters of cultural
differences.
• Demonstrate knowledge of cultural nuances by correctly matching them with
their region of origin.
Attention to Detail
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• Briefings presented will follow strict template and time guidelines. Any devia-
tion results in task failure.
• Weekly uniform inspections will be performed.
• Without referring to the knowledge book, students will be able to recite infor-
mation from the book on the appropriate day.
To reiterate, the objectives above are created to instill the essential skills listed
in Figure 4.10. These skills drive the creation of the objectives and are developed in
accordance with AFMAN 36-2234.
Figure 4.10: 12 Unique Skill/Knowledge Items
4.9 Summary
This chapter reviewed the results of this research. It presented a doctrinally
tied argument for the legitimacy of social engineering as a tool for Air Force use.
Recognizing the need for metrics to measure effectiveness of any weapon, it then pre-
sented a framework for planning and performing BDA of a social engineering opera-
tion. Finally, it presented sample objectives, obtained according to Air Force course
development guidelines, for training a cadre of social engineers.
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V. Conclusions
In war, there is no prize for the runner up
–Gen Omar Bradley
The dominance of US forces in the military arena has created an unexpected areaof vulnerability. Placing so much attention on being the best in the realm of
conventional warfare has come at the cost of being slow to realize other, less con-
ventional methods for conducting and winning battles. We have robbed Peter to
pay Paul. Social engineering is one area where this is evident. It is a proven attack
method, used in the corporate world for over twenty years by individuals like Kevin
Mitnick and yet it remains largely ignored
5.1 Problem Summary
Social engineering as a multi-disciplinary attack method has received limited
study in the academic world. It utilizes psychological pressure points in order to
extract information from a computer system. This method of attack bypasses most if
not all technology based security measures by turning a trusted system user into an
unwitting accomplice. It is cheap, it is easy, it is coming.
Social engineering deserves a seat at the table where discussions about Infor-
mation Operations are being held; it is consistent with existing doctrine specifically
as it relates to practice of military deception and psychological operations. In order
to earn that seat, or rather to facilitate a transition into that seat, social engineering
must be defined in the framework of current doctrine and methods to implement and
measure it must be presented. However, this is large issue and this research merely
opens the door to let a small amount of light fall on it.
5.2 Future Research
One of the original research questions was “Can a Social Engineering attack be
planned and measured?” This research provides one method for an affirmative answer
to that question but refinements remain. One possible avenue of future research is
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to apply a predictive statistical model to this problem in order to achieve the desired
robustness and flexibility. It is possible that the visible reaction of the adversary will
not match what is expected and yet still indicates a successful operation. Or it may
be that the particular adversary does not outwardly display the expected reaction
but it is reasonable to expect others in a similar situation to react in the desired
manner. The current framework does not easily adjust to these unpredictable results
but applying a mathematical approach to it might yield more flexibility.
Another area for future work is in applying the proposed framework to a past
PSYOP or MILDEC operation. As demonstrated earlier, these are close siblings
of social engineering and would provide a good approximation in lieu of real data
from a social engineering operation. This would provide a better indication of the
framework’s viability.
A third area of future research is in expanding the provided training objectives,
building them into a full training plan in accordance with the ISD process. Methods
of instruction and an implementation plan would be the next logical step.
Finally, this research focused on the Air Force and its doctrine. Expanding
into Joint doctrine and the doctrine of sister services could yield a more complete
indication of the direction needed in order to bring social engineering on line for the
military. Additionally, it could increase its legitimacy in the Air Force if similar results
were found when investigating other doctrine.
5.3 Limitations
This research is a mental exercise, an attempt to draw links and propose a
foundation to continue social engineering growth. As such, no real-world application
was attempted and so the framework remains theoretical. Without the presence of a
cyber operations force to test theories like this one, there is no way to implement and
evaluate its efficacy.
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Limitations were also found in the realm of information availability. Classified
anecdotes and examples from real world operations were not included in the research.
Additionally, there are few reliable published accounts outside of those cited in this
text of social engineering events. This is likely due to the victims (usually corpora-
tions) of those attacks being unwilling to publicize the event as well as the inability
to confirm individual stories of exploits.
Finally, the existence of what could best be termed a stigma against seemingly
underhanded tactics like social engineering cannot be ignored. Much like the negative
undertones that still cling to the military sniper [37], social engineering has a negative
connotation for many. There are several possible reasons for this. It may be the close
relation between social engineering and the classic confidence scam as evidenced by
the way many authors use the terms interchangeably [23]. Or it may be that those
in a position to study it are also those on the receiving end of day to day attempts.
Finally, it could be a misconception about the implied integrity of a social engineer.
5.4 Impact
This research demonstrates the importance and relevance of social engineering
to the Air Force. It serves as the beginning line in what is hoped will become a widely
held discussion about the place social engineering should hold. Through connections
to existing doctrine, it has shown that social engineering is reasonably close to tactics
we are already using, making it represent a smaller shift in thinking and thus a
more palatable option. In fact, Red Teams regularly use social engineering. By
providing a rudimentary frame work for planning and evaluating a social engineering
operation, which is based on an accepted and proven process, it took the first step in
implementing it. It begins the training process by providing the first usable example
of what is required to bring this capability to the Air Force.
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5.5 Final Thought
Social engineering is a powerful weapon. If the Air Force does not task resources
towards harnessing it, it can be certain that an adversary will. That, more than any
other argument presented in this thesis, should justify further investigation of offensive
social engineering.
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